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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Arthur Gene Schmierer appeals from the district court's order denying his I. C.R. 
35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2009, a Canyon County grand jury charged Schmierer in a Superseding 
Indictment ("Indictment") with enticing children over the internet (Count I) and attempted 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen (Count 11).1 (R., pp.27-28.) Pursuant to a 
binding Rule 11 plea agreement, accepted by the district court, Schmierer pied guilty to 
Count I and to an amended Count II, which charged a second incident of enticing a child 
through use of the internet; the parties and court agreed that Schmierer would be 
sentenced to two consecutive five-year fixed terms, for a total of ten years fixed, and 
that any indeterminate time would be left open. (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.18, 
L.17.) The United States Attorney's Office agreed to refrain from filing additional 
charges (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.12, Ls.5-12), and Schmierer agreed to "waive any possible 
deficiencies in the original charging" (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). Count II of the Indictment was 
amended by the prosecutor presenting the court an Amended Superseding Indictment 
("Amended Indictment"). (R., pp.49-51; Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.) The state did not 
obtain a probable cause determination by the grand jury. (R., p.107 ("The Amended 
Superseding Indictment was not signed by the Grand Jury.").) The district court 
1 Count II of the Indictment, attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, was 
based on Schmierer using a telephone to set up a meeting with a supposed 13 year-old 
girl -- actually an undercover adult female agent of Idaho's Internet Crimes Against 
Children Task Force -- in order to engage in intimate sexual acts with her, and driving to 
the arranged location for that purpose. (R., pp.7-8.) 
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sentenced Schmierer as agreed upon, adding that the two sentences would be for ten 
years unified on each count, with five years fixed (consecutive). (R., pp.60-63, 66-67.) 
In 2012, Schmierer filed an "IRC 35 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences," arguing 
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to convict him under Count 
II of the Amended Indictment because probable cause had not been established by the 
grand jury for that count. (R., pp.72-85.) After the state filed a response to Schmierer's 
Rule 35 motion (R., pp.86-95), the court held a hearing on the motion, and subsequently 
entered an Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, explaining, in part: 
Here, Defendant specifically waived any defects in the charging 
document. He agreed to the amendment to the Indictment that reduced 
the attempted Lewd and Lascivious conduct charge to a lesser charge. 
Having made such a waiver he cannot now claim that his sentence on the 
"Amended Indictment" was illegal. 
(R., p.108; see 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.15.) 
Schmierer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.102-104.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Schmierer states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 motion to 
correct an illegal sentence? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over Count II of the 
Amended Indictment, and, by pleading guilty, has Schmierer waived his right to a 
probable cause determination on that count? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Count II Of The Amended 
Indictment, And, By Pleading Guilty, Schmierer Waived His Right To A Probable Cause 
Determination On That Count 
A. Introduction 
Schmierer argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to allow 
the state to amend Count II of the Indictment -- from alleging attempted lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen to alleging enticing children over the internet -- because the 
new charge was not a lesser offense of the original charge and there was no probable 
cause finding by the grand jury to support the new charge. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-16.) 
Schmierer's claim fails because Count II of the Amended Indictment gave the district 
court subject matter jurisdiction because it alleged Schmierer committed an offense in 
the state of Idaho, and, by pleading guilty, Schmierer waived his right to have the grand 
jury make a probable cause determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at 
anytime and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 
699, 701 (2004) (citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995) 
and State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998)). 
C. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction In Regard To Count II Of The 
Amended Indictment 
Schmierer asserts "[t]he district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
the Amended Superceding Indictment charged a crime that was not an included offense 
under the original indictment, and in fact was an entirely different incident, involving a 
4 
different fictitious minor in Utah, than the facts voted on by the grand jury." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.7.) Schmierer specifically contends, in sequence: 
(1) the amended Count II "was apparently for previous communications 
with another law enforcement official pretending to be a minor in 
Utah[,]" 
(2) "[t]he issue of whether the communications between Mr. Schmierer 
and the fictitious minor in Utah constituted a crime was never 
before the grand jury[,]" therefore, 
(c) the Amended Indictment "was invalid as the issue of whether Mr. 
Schmierer could be charged with a crime based on his alleged 
internet contact with the fictitious minor in Utah was never before 
the grand jury." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
In sum, Schmierer contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over Count II, as amended, because it charged him with a new crime that had not been 
subjected to a probable cause determination by the grand jury.2 Review of the 
amended Count II shows it bestowed subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 3 
It is well established that it is the charging document that confers jurisdiction on a 
district court. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) ('The 
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the state 
2 The fact that Schmierer may have been led to believe that the minor child he was 
enticing through the use of the internet and/or telephone was from Utah is of no 
consequence. She was not actually a minor child or from Utah. More importantly, 
under l.C. § 18-1509A(5), "[t]he offense is committed in the state of Idaho for purposes 
of determining jurisdiction if the transmission that constitutes the offense either 
originates in or is received in the state of Idaho." According to the grand jury transcript, 
Schmierer resided in Canyon County, Idaho, and made illegal internet and/or phone 
communications with the fictitious underaged minor ("Emily Kotter") in Idaho. (Grand 
Jury Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.9, L.22; p.14, L.20 - p.24, L.5; p.27, L.25 - p.37, L.4.) 
3 Count II of the Amended Indictment contains no language of any "fictitious minor in 
Utah" (see Appellant's Brief, p.10), nor does it contain any language suggesting the 
offense occurred outside of Idaho (see R., p.50). 
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of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.") (citing State v. Slater, 71 
Idaho 335, 338, 231 P.2d 424, 425 (1951)). An indictment confers jurisdiction in a 
criminal case if it alleges an offense was committed within the State of Idaho. State v. 
Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621, 115 P.3d 710, 712 (2005). Whether the indictment is 
sufficient to satisfy due process is a separate question, unrelated to whether the court 
has jurisdiction. !sL State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting the Idaho Supreme Court has "clearly differentiat[ed] between due 
process and jurisdictional queries"). Thus, the only question relevant to the 
jurisdictional analysis is whether the Amended Indictment alleged an offense in the 
State of Idaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-758, 101 P.3d 699, 701-702 (2004). 
Schmierer's assertion that the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the amended Count II is incorrect. Count II of the Amended Indictment 
charged Schmierer with the crime of enticing a child through use of the internet, in 
violation of I.C. § 18-1509A,4 and in the State of Idaho, as follows: 
4 I.C. § 18-1509A reads in relevant part: 
(1) a person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony 
if such person knowingly uses the internet or any device that provides 
transmission of messages, signals, facsimiles, video images or other 
communication to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or 
actions, or both, a person under the age of sixteen (16) years or a person 
the defendant believes to be under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
engage in any sexual act with or against the person where such act would 
be a violation of chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code. 
(5) The offense is committed in the state of Idaho for purposes of determining 
jurisdiction if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates in or is 
received in the state of Idaho. 
6 
That the Defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about 
between November 22, 2008 and January 9, 2009, in the County of 
Canyon, State of Idaho, did knowingly use the internet to solicit, seduce, 
lure, persuade or entice by word or action or both, a person Defendant 
believes to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage 
in any sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of 
Chapter 15, 61, or 66, Title 18, Idaho Code, and that the Defendant is at 
least eighteen (18) years old. 
(R., p.50.) 
Inasmuch as Count II of the Amended Indictment charged that an existing Idaho 
crime was committed by Schmierer in the State of Idaho (R., p.50), there was nothing 
facially deficient about that amended count. 5 Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional 
defect and the court had subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the Count II, as 
amended. Schmierer's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the 
Indictment is without merit. 
D. By Pleading Guilty, Schmierer Waived His Right To Have The Grand Jury Make 
A Probable Cause Determination In Regard To Count II 
Schmierer entered a guilty plea to Count 11 of the Amended Indictment pursuant 
to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement. (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.18, L.17.) The 
agreement called for Schmierer to plead guilty to enticing a child through use of the 
internet instead of the charge of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 
and to be sentenced to a minimum of two consecutive five-year fixed terms, for a total of 
ten years fixed. (Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.11, L.22; R., pp.52-58.) Schmierer also agreed to 
"waive any possible deficiencies in the original charging" (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). At the plea 
5 Although the district court did not base its denial of Schmierer's Rule 35 motion to 
correct an illegal sentence on the same reasons expressed here, its ruling should 
nonetheless be affirmed on appeal on the correct theory. See Row v. State, 135 Idaho 
573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001) ("Where the lower court reaches the correct result by 
an erroneous theory" this Court can apply "the correct theory" and affirm). 
7 
entry hearing, the state presented the court with an Amended Indictment, amending 
Count II to allege enticing a child through the use of the internet; the state did not seek a 
probable cause determination by the grand jury in regard to that count. (R., pp.49-51, 
107; Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.) 
Schmierer filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence in 2012, and after 
a hearing, the district court denied the motion, ruling that Schmierer's guilty plea waived 
his right to have the grand jury determine whether Count II of the Amended Indictment 
was supported by probable cause. (R., pp.72-85, 107-109; 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, 
L.15.) Schmierer has failed to show any error in the district court's decision. 
The reason for having an indictment is to establish a finding of probable cause. 
Article 1, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to 
a finding of probable cause either through a grand jury or a preliminary hearing. See 
State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995). With regard to 
preliminary hearings, it is well-established that a defendant's right to a probable cause 
determination can be waived. 19..,_; see also State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671 
P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983). It is also well settled that a valid plea of guilty, 
voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and 
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings.6 State v. Dunlap, 
123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 
P. 2d at 1106. 
6 Schmierer's reliance on State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967), and 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525,261 P.3d 519 (2011) (see Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15), 
is misplaced because those cases involved jury trials -- not, as here, a plea agreement 
~hereby the defendant agreed to plead guilty to an amended (and less serious) charge. 
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In Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction because of a 
defect in the preliminary hearing process. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded 
Fowler waived his right to challenge the probable cause determination once he pied 
guilty: 
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his right to 
contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to require the 
accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty, 
voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects 
and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. 
Here Fowler does not attack the entry and acceptance of his plea. His 
plea of guilty to the restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of 
the procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the 
preliminary hearing itself, on that charge. 
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations 
omitted). Here, the claimed defect is in the grand jury process, not the preliminary 
hearing process. Nevertheless, the intents and purposes of these two events are the 
same -- they both determine whether the state has sufficient cause, probable cause, to 
hold the person for trial. There is no reason why a defendant can waive that probable 
cause determination in one proceeding and not in another. 
Although Count II of the Amended Indictment charged Schmierer with committing 
a different offense than the original Count II, because Schmierer voluntarily pied guilty 
to that amended count pursuant to a plea agreement, he waived his right to have the 
grand jury make a probable cause finding in regard to it. Schmierer has failed to show 
that his right to have Count II of the Amended Indictment screened for probable cause 
was violated. Accordingly, Schmierer has failed to show any error in the district court's 
denial of his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2014. 
JOH , C. McKINNEY 
Dep ty Attorney Genera 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of April, 2014 served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
n . McKinney 
ty Attorney General 
JCM/pm 
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